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In the public debate over economic perspec-
tives in the euro area, the risk of being close to a
so-called “liquidity trap” has been frequently
mentioned(1). The underlying idea is that, in a con-
text of low inflation and low nominal interest
rates, monetary authorities have little room to
carry out further cuts to interest rates to counteract
unfavourable shocks to the economy (since nomi-
nal interest rates cannot fall below zero). In this
situation, monetary policy loses its capacity to in-
fluence the economy through the interest rate
channel. This situation rises immediately the ques-
tion of whether it is desirable that monetary policy
counteracts those shocks — that is, if monetary
policy should adopt a counter-cyclical posture.
Regardless of whether a counter-cyclical policy
is desirable or not, economic literature is fairly
consensual in pointing that monetary shocks
should be counteracted (setting aside eventual
problems of identification of the origin of the
shock). The most cited empirical cases of liquidity
traps (the great depression in the USA and the re-
cent Japanese economic situation) provide exam-
ples of shocks originated in the monetary sphere,
as they were related to a collapse in asset prices
and to a banking crisis. Therefore, we are in the
presence of cases where the interest rate channel is
not the most relevant one, neither does it act as the
active constraint.
Meanwhile, it is currently consensual that the
interest rate channel is not the only existing one;
indeed, at least two other channels are accepted —
the assets price effects and the credit channel. In
this context, the debate around the effectiveness of
monetary policy in a situation of very low interest
rates is reduced to the debate around the empirical
relevance of these channels. In any case, in the
context of the recognition of these channels (inde-
pendently of their empirical significance), it seems
difficult to argue that monetary policy is fully in-
operative in a context of null or virtually null in-
terest rates.
Finally, in spite of the existence of alternative
channels there is the question of whether there are
costs associated with the non-operation of the in-
terest rate channel. Some empirical research tries
to measure the costs of the reduction in effective-
ness of monetary policy in the presence of a li-
quidity trap. However, the results of these studies
are subject to the Lucas critique, since they build
upon data from a non-zero inflation regime, and
hence do not incorporate the adjustment of the
agents’ behaviour to the change in regime. On the
contrary, several contexts exist (namely when con-
sidering optimal taxation principles) where the op-
timal result points towards null or virtually null
interest rates (i.e., the Friedman rule).
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(1) See for instance “The Economist” (February 20th 1999) and the
“European Weekly Analyst” Goldman Sachs (January 29th
1999).These issues are further developed in the fol-
lowing sections. Section 2 revisits the liquidity
trap concept, and explores the reasons why this
might be a current issue in Europe. Section 3 dis-
cusses the desirability of a counter-cyclical mone-
tary policy, while situations of simultaneity be-
tween a liquidity trap and a banking crisis are ana-
lysed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses alternative
channels of transmission of monetary policy,
which are not directly related with the interest
rate. Some consideration around the existence or
not of transitory and/or permanent costs due to
the non-operation of the interest rate channel in a
regime of price stability are presented in Sechion
6. Finally, in the light of the previous reflections,
section 7 draws some conclusions regarding the
current situation of the euro area.
2. THE LIQUIDITY TRAP AND THE CURRENT
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN EUROPE
To simplify the presentation without losing
generality, consider a closed economy where be-
yond money (strictly defined as circulation plus
demand deposits) exists solely one financial asset,
that yield a nominal return at the rate of interest i;
under these circumstances, interest rate i cannot be
negative: no one would choose to hold an asset
with a negative nominal return. In practise (admit-
ting economic agents are risk-averse), the lower
admissible boundary for the interest rate (this
limit being denoted by i) is marginally positive,
due to considerations of liquidity and /or risk.
If the nominal interest rate becomes close
enough to lower boundary i, economic agents be-
come virtually indifferent between holding money
and holding the financial asset. Any additional
amount of money injected in the economy by the
monetary authority will render a relatively small
effect on the demanded amount of the financial as-
set, hence the interest rate is not affected signifi-
cantly. In other words, in the context of very low
interest rate levels, money demand will tend to be
perfectly elastic vis-à-vis the interest rate, and
therefore any money injection will result chiefly in
a reduction of money circulation velocity (defined
as the ratio between nominal output and the
money stock of the economy).
This situation, where no manoeuvre room is
left to reduce the interest rate any further — im-
plying the incapability of the monetary policy in-
terest rate channel to counteract (or accommodate)
eventual unfavourable shocks over the economy,
is what Keynes referred to as the “liquidity trap”.
The term “liquidity trap” is often related to the
so-called deflationary spiral. The underlying idea
is that, if the economy is caught in a liquidity trap
and if an unfavourable shock to the economy leads
to recession and deflation, the real interest rate
will rise,yielding additional recessive and defla-
tionary effects on the economy. These effects are
widened if there is rigidity towards reductions of
nominal wages. In this case, deflation also results
in the rise of real wages, contributing to the fur-
ther aggravation of recession.
In the public discussion around economic per-
spectives in the euro area, the risk of becoming
closer to a liquidity trap situation has been re-
ferred frequently. Currently the euro area exhibits:
— low inflation (virtually null when adjusted
for the bias in the consumer price index(2).I n
March, the HICP in the euro area grew 1.0
per cent in year-on-year terms, and 1.0 per
cent in annual average terms;
— relatively low nominal interest rates. Fol-
lowing to the decision of 8 April, the rate of
the main refinancing operations of the ECB
(the repo rate) was cut to 2.5 per cent, and
the interest rates on the deposit facility and
the marginal lending facility were cut re-
spectively to 1.5 and 3.5 per cent. The
3-month Euribor rate fell to 2.6 per cent in
mid-April;
— high growth rates of aggregate M1, signifi-
cantly above those of broader aggregates. In
March, aggregate M1 grew 10.8 per cent in
year-on-year terms, while aggregate M3
grew 5.1 per cent.
In this context, some argue that the ECB room
of manoeuvre to carry out further cuts to the inter-
vention interest rates is quite narrow. These cuts
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(2) For the USA, the commission headed by Michael Boskin con-
cluded that the CPI overestimates inflation on average by 1.1
p.p. every year. In a similar exercise, the Bundesbank con-
cluded that the bias of the CPI in Germany averages 0.75 p.p.
every year.would be seen as desirable if unfavourable shocks
to the European economy took place, for instance:
— a sudden and significant fall in external de-
mand (resulting inter alia from hard-landing
of the USA economy); and/or
— a strong depreciation of the USD vis-à-vis
the euro; and/or
— a stock market crash in Europe and in the
USA (eventually due to the bursting of a
speculative bubble).
3. DESIRABILITY OF A COUNTER-CYCLICAL
MONETARY POLICY
The previous section raised doubts about the
general effectiveness of monetary policy to re-
spond to unfavourable shocks to the economy in a
context of very low interest rates. Before further
discussing effectiveness, it is convenient to ascer-
tain if monetary policy should exhibit a coun-
ter-cyclical posture.
Nowadays, it is commonly accepted that the
monetary authority should use at each period t its
instruments to minimise a loss function of the fol-
lowing type(3):
()()() Lp p y y i i tt t t
n




where pt is the inflation rate forecast for a given
horizon (one to two years), p* is the inflation rate
objective pursued by monetary authorities, yt
stands for the observed real output, yt
nis natural or
potential output of the economy, yt
n is the
short-term interest rate, λ is the (non-negative) re-
lative weight monetary authorities attribute to the
stabilisation of the output gap () yy tt
n − and β is
the (non-negative) relative weight authorities as-
cribe to short-term interest rate stabilisation.
Although most economists subscribe the loss
function above, they diverge widely in what con-
cerns the levels or weights and the concept of po-
tential output considered.
Regarding weights, the case where λ=β =0 cor-
responds to a strict inflation objective, while case
where λ > 0 and /or β > 0 represent situations
where the monetary authority bears concerns with
the stabilisation of the output gap and /or the
short-term interest rate.
As regards potential output and the output
gap, three distinct concepts can be referred to,
with distinct implications on the guidance of mon-
etary policy. The most traditional concept views
potential output simply as the trend of the ob-
served output time series(4). In this case, if λ >0 ,
monetary authorities must counteract all shocks to
the economy, to stabilise the output growth rate
towards its recent average level.
A second concept of potential output lies upon
the distinction made between different kinds of
shocks to the economy(5):
— “aggregate demand shocks”, defined as
those yielding no lasting effects on output,
rendering only cyclical fluctuation;
— “aggregate supply shocks”, defined as those
yielding a lasting effect on output - for in-
stance, productivity/ technology shocks and
shocks on the international prices of com-
modities.
According to this perspective, potential output
should be understood as the outcome of the accu-
mulation of supply shocks (and not as a mere alge-
braic trend). Therefore, monetary policy should
only attempt to counteract observed output vola-
tility when it results from shocks rendering a tem-
porary effect (i.e., aggregate demand shocks).
However, a counter-cyclical monetary policy like
this must bear in mind that:
— it appears to be quite difficult to recognise
the nature of shocks to the economy, espe-
cially with due timeliness;
— lags associated to the guidance of monetary
policy are relatively lengthy and variable.
In this context, the counter-cyclical posture of
monetary policy should be assumed with modera-
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(3) See for instance Svensson (1999).
(4) This is the underlying concept when potential output is calcu-
lated using linear trends or time filters, like the Hodrick-
Prescott filter.
(5) For example, underlying monetary policy guidance by the
Swedish central bank, in the context of the inflation target
strategy, is a potential output concept of this type (see Sveriges
Riskbank - Memorandum 1999.02.04).tion, so it does not render effects opposite to the
expected ones — i.e., so it does not widen, instead
of narrowing, cyclical fluctuations of output and
inflation.
Finally, the potential output concept present in
Real-Business Cycle models is broader. These
models identify real shocks and monetary shocks,
the latter (basically shocks in money circulation
velocity) being the only ones rendering potential
output unaffected. Other kinds of shocks affect si-
multaneously potential and effective output. In
this perspective, monetary policy must be neutral
in relation to all non-monetary shocks. This neu-
trality does not mean that monetary policy is left
with no manoeuvre room. If frictions exist (e.g.,
monopolistic competition and price rigidity, under
multi-period contracts), monetary policy should
act so that the economy emulates the “ideal” be-
haviour that would be recorded if no frictions
were present. Admitting stable inflation, nominal
interest rates may, for instance, reproduce the
equilibrium adjustment behaviour of the interest
rate. Examples of policy response vis-à-vis shocks
to the economy idealised by this current are pre-
sented in Appendix.
Therefore, we conclude that the issue of the
monetary policy posture towards shocks to the
economy is far from consensual; furthermore we
conclude that the relevance of the Keynesian “li-
quidity trap” problem is greater the less moderate
is the counter-cyclical posture defended for mone-
tary policy.
4. LIQUIDITY TRAP AND BANKING CRISIS
The most cited examples of liquidity trap situa-
tions (the great depression in the USA and the re-
cent economic situation in Japan) were linked to a
collapse of asset prices and to a banking crisis. In
these cases, the interest rate channel is not the
most relevant one, neither it is the active con-
straint. From what follows from the previous sec-
tion, it is fairly consensual that the monetary au-
thority should counteract monetary shocks, acting
as lender of last resort if necessary.
Recall that this was not the policy pursued in
the USA during the great depression in the 1930s;
in fact, this period saw a contraction of the nomi-
nal stock of money(6). Although prices fell 24 per
cent between 1929 and 1933, the reduction of the
nominal stock of money determined the mainte-
nance of the real stock, eliminating one of the
mechanisms that could have led to the recovery of
the USA economy. The fall in the nominal stock of
money did not result from a reduction of the mon-
etary basis (H) (which rose from USD 7.1 billion in
1929 to USD 19.4 billion in 1933). Instead, it re-
sulted from a reduction of the money multiplier
(M1 / H) (from 3.1 in 1929 to 2.4 in 1933) due to
the insolvency of more than 4,000 banks out of
20,000 existing in 1929. Indeed, the fact that the
Federal Reserve Bank maintained a restrictive pos-
ture regarding banks’ access to primary liquidity
throughout this period magnified the effects of the
burst of a speculative bubble on the banking sys-
tem - hence determining the insolvency of a signif-
icant number of banks. In this context, monetary
authorities in the USA have frequently been held
responsible for the deepening of the depression.
However, the moral hazard problems associ-
ated to the existence of an entity acting as lender
of last resort cannot be disregarded. In the absence
of appropriate supervision, if the banking system
foresees a bail-out from monetary authorities, in-
stitutions will tend to assume excessive risk, wors-
ening their financial vulnerability.
5. ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS OF
TRANSMITION OF MONETARY POLICY
The relevance of the liquidity trap depends cru-
cially on the importance attributed to the interest
rate channel in the monetary policy transmission
mechanisms. The interest rate channel is usually
motivated with the conventional Keynesian
IS/LM model: the central bank determines
short-term interest rates (through its intervention
rates), which in turn affect long-term rates; these
influence companies’ investment decisions, as well
as households’ (durable good) consumption ones.
Therefore, for the liquidity trap to constitute a
problem to the management of monetary policy, it
is required that short-term interest rates provide
the dominant channel through which monetary
decisions are transmitted to the economy.
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(6) See for instance White (1990).It is consensual nowadays that the interest rate
channel is not the only existing one; the following
complementary channels — the so-called direct
channels — are often pinpointed:
— the relative asset prices channel (including
the exchange rate);
— the credit channel.
The first channel recognises that central banks
influence the structure of portfolios and/or asset
prices, generating this way temporary effects on
the demand for goods and services. A monetary
shock(7) disturbs the equilibrium structure of eco-
nomic agents’ asset portfolios; it also induces
changes in the demand for real assets and hence
rendering changes to their relative prices. In addi-
tion, if the central bank induces an expansion of
the monetary base through the purchase of foreign
currency, the national currency depreciates, which
in turn stimulates the demand for domesti-
cally-produced tradable goods and services. Note,
however, that the devaluation may render per-
verse effects if domestic economic agents are
highly indebted in foreign currency.
Meanwhile, regardless of the way liquidity in-
jection is carried out, agents’ expectations about
future inflation in the economy may also be af-
fected. At first, this will reduce real long-term in-
terest rates, with the resulting expansionary effects
on the economy.
As regards the credit channel(8), it stresses the
special role played in monetary transmission by
banking credit to the economy. This role is en-
hanced due to the limited access some economic
agents (namely small companies and consumers)
have to other financing sources. This credit chan-
nel can be broken-down into two sub-channels:
the debtor’s balance sheet channel and the bank
lending channel. The first sub-channel takes into
account the changes caused by monetary policy in
the value of borrowers’ collateral. In turn, the sec-
ond channel stresses the central bank’s ability to
influence the amount of credit banks may grant to
the economy. Therefore, due to the existence of
these widely recognised direct transmission chan-
nels, which are complementary to the interest rate
channel, the discussion around the inopera-
tionality of monetary policy in a very low interest
rate environment focuses on the debate around the
empirical relevance of direct transmission chan-
nels. It should be noted that, with deflation and
even without additional money injection, if direct
channels are relevant in practice, an “automatic
stabiliser” effect on economic activity (the
so-called Pigou effect) is reached through in-
creases to the real money stock. The money sur-
plus vis-à-vis its desired level yields an effect that
is equivalent to a liquidity injection by the central
bank, thus stimulating the economy.
Pro-Keynesian economists(9) usually consider
that the effects of monetary policy transmission
through interest rate changes are dominant, pay-
ing little empirical relevance to direct effects tak-
ing place with no changes to the interest rate. On
the other hand, economists of a more monetarist
or neo-classical tradition(10) tend to emphasise di-
rect channels, undramatising the dangers of the li-
quidity trap, but specially unrecognising monetary
policy is inoperative in situations of very low in-
terest rates.
6. INOPERATIONALITY VERSUS OPTIMALITY
OF THE MONETARY POLICY GUIDANCE
UNDER VERY LOW INTEREST RATES
Regardless of the issue of eventual inoper-
ationality of monetary policy under null or virtu-
ally null nominal interest rates, there is the issue
around whether there are costs associated to the
loss of the interest rate channel. The analysis of
this issue requires the comparison between a mod-
erate inflation regime (exhibiting occasionally low
interest rates) and a null inflation one (with low
interest rates).
Curiously, economic literature on long-run
monetary policy rules suggests that an optimal
policy is consistent with null or close to zero nomi-
nal interest rates (this finding is known in litera-
ture as the Friedman rule). The underlying intu-
ition builds upon the idea that the price of a good
should equal its marginal production cost. Since
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(7) The reference to shocks refers to unexpected events.
(8) See for instance Bernark and Gertler (1995).
(9) See for instance Summers (1991).
(10)For example, Friedman (1969) and Meltzer (1999).money has a negligible production cost, optimality
is reached when the price of holding money is null
(i.e. the interest rate is zero). This means that the
inflation rate should equal the symmetric of the
rate of return of capital (i.e., the real equilibrium
interest rate), to which corresponds deflation.
Even when principles of optimal taxation are
taken into account, the Friedman rule seems to
hold(11). The optimality of this rule should, how-
ever, be faced with caution since some consider-
ations — of the kind of informal economy taxa-
tion, high costs of collecting taxes on consumption
and /or income, and the rigidity of nominal wages
towards reductions — justify a price stability pol-
icy in the long-run (i.e., zero or marginally positive
inflation, instead of deflation). Furthermore, the
Friedman rule is a long-run one, therefore over-
looking the manner in which monetary policy
should be managed in the presence of short-run
shocks. Furthermore, the arguments on optimal
taxation in favour of the optimality of the Fried-
man rule are conditioned to the kind of economic
representation (i.e., the model) considered.
Some recent empirical research trying to mea-
sure the costs of losing the interest rate channel
compares the effects on output due to unfavour-
able shocks to the economy in a context of moder-
ate inflation with a zero-inflation one (Fuhrer and
Madigan (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland
(1998)). The general finding is that a moderate
level of inflation is preferred to zero inflation.
They conclude that output variability increases
with close to zero inflation objectives (where reces-
sions are more frequent and more intense). Other
empirical research (Akerlof, Dickens and Perry
(1996)) argues that permanent costs are present
due to the existence of nominal wages downward
rigidity, which also favours a non-zero inflation
target.
These studies present, however, several draw-
backs. First, they use data from a non-zero infla-
tion environment, and extrapolate findings to a
zero inflation regime, which is obviously subject to
the Lucas critique (i.e., the adjustment of agents’
behaviour to the change of regime is not taken into
account). Moreover, as referred when discussing
the Friedman rule, the results of the models con-
sidered in these research are conditioned to the
type of model and to the simplifications assumed
(for instance, the influence of monetary policy is
limited to the interest rate channel, ignoring the
direct transmission channels referred in section 5).
This discussion illustrates the fact that it is not
possible to reach a definitive conclusion on what
regime is preferable — a null inflation regime or a
low inflation one. Nevertheless, even the Fried-
man rule critics defend low inflation levels, to
which correspond moderate interest rates (as op-
posed to zero or close to zero interest rates).
7.CONCLUSION
The reflections above and the current European
economic situation make us conclude that the euro
area is not presently in a liquidity trap situation.
First, the current interest rate levels are compatible
with a moderately counter-cyclical monetary pol-
icy. Furthermore, if important shocks that lead the
economy to virtually null interest rate levels come
to happen, existing alternative monetary policy
transmission channels (namely the exchange rate
and policies of communication/management of
expectations) should prevent the confirmation of
pessimistic scenarios.
In the past, the situations closer to the liquidity
trap (the great depression in the USA and the Jap-
anese crisis in the 1990s) took place alongside
banking crises, after speculative bubbles in asset
prices burst. However, Meltzer (1999) also reports
some cases for the USA where very low nominal
interest rates were reached without a banking cri-
sis; the Swiss case over the last decades provides
also an illustration to this situation. Therefore,
more than challenging to the guidance of the mon-
etary policy in the euro area, taken in its strict
sense, a situation of virtually null interest rates re-
quires a special effort and awareness from bank-
ing supervision, namely in a context of inflation in
asset prices.
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(11)For instance Correia and Teles (1996;1999).Appendix (12)
In the context of Real-Business Cycle models,
monetary policy should promote money neutrality
over real activity even in the short-run (a neutral
policy meaning a policy allowing to sustain output
at its potential level in a context of price stability).
This neutrality does not imply that no manoeuvre
room is left to the short-run effectiveness of mone-
tary policy. If frictions (e.g., monopolistic competi-
tion and price rigidity, with multi-period con-
tracts) exist, monetary policy shall act so that the
economy “emulates” the behaviour of an economy
free of those frictions.
This position is illustrated below. Consider a
closed economy with an aggregate supply curve
(Ys) and an aggregate demand curve (Yd) defined
in space (Yt, Rt), where Yt and Rt stand respec-
tively for output and real interest rates. Admit the
economy is initially at equilibrium (Y*, r*):
A favourable (and permanent) shock in pro-
ductivity can be analysed as follows: an improve-
ment in productivity shifts aggregate supply to the
right while it also induces an increase in consump-
tion and a reduction, through the wealth effect, of
labour supply. The increase in consumption makes
aggregate demand shift outwards, while the re-
duction of labour supply induces an inward shift
of aggregate supply, offsetting part of the previous
movement (see chart).
Therefore, a favourable productivity shock
leads to a rise in equilibrium output, from Y* to
Y*’, but renders no significant effect on the real in-
terest rate in the longer-run.
In the adjustment to the new equilibrium, it is
possible that the impact on aggregate demand is
faster than the impact on aggregate supply, and
that the real interest rate rises temporarily. Ac-
cording to this current, to maintain price stability,
monetary authorities should rise the nominal in-
terest rate to accommodate the real interest rate in-
crease, and to avoid that the expansionary impact
of the shock is too great. This kind of directive
contrasts, for instance, with the posture of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank (the Fed) two or three years ago:
the Fed argued that nominal interest rates needn’t
be raised to control inflation, since a favourable
productivity shock had already limited inflation-
ary pressures.
In the case of an unfavourable supply-side
shock — of the kind of an increase in imported
commodity prices — basically the symmetric of
the example presented would have resulted.
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